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Paper 
The dock worker: registered or precarious? 
In a recent the EFTA court strikes a blow to the regulated labour market scheme for 
dock work. Such systems are common to many countries, are protected by an ILO 
convention and designed to benefit both dockworkers and their employers. 
Nonetheless, at present, they are often regarded as outdated, inefficient and contrary 
to European law.  
1. The origins of the pool system 
In many ports in Europe regulations and practices exist which restrict the loading 
and unloading of goods. Such regulations and practices can be found in a majority of 
EU member states1. Often a pool is put into place which requires for the registration 
of the dockworkers and grants priority or even exclusivity of employment to registered 
dockworkers. Terminal operators in need of dock work services have to hire 
dockworkers from the pool which is organised by employers and trade unions jointly.  
The restricted access to dock work has been the response to the precarious situation 
of dockworkers. As the size of the ships and the frequency of their arrivals varied, 
dock work was usually carried out on a day by day basis. Therefore, in the early 20th 
century pools of registered port workers were created by management and labour 
which had to ensure a steady availability to employers of experienced staff as well as 
an elementary form of job security for registered workers2. After the second world war 
dockworkers gained more extensive income protection as employment and working 
practices were further regulated by law or on the basis of collective agreements. To 
give dock workers sufficient guarantees of employment and income, the number of 
dock workers had to be kept in line with the growth in port demand3. Only in case of 
a shortage in qualified dock workers, employers were allowed to hire workers outside 
the pool.  
The system was beneficial for both employers and dock workers: the employers could 
have recourse to a flexible, cheap and competent labour force, while the dock workers 
enjoyed employment stability or at least income security, as differences in supply and 
demands were compensated by social security benefits. Furthermore, in several 
                                                             
1 16 out of 22 maritime member states, and among those 16 EU member states, 13 states make use of 
registers and 11 grant preferential rights to registered dockworkers, see E. VAN HOOYDONCK, Port 
Labour in the EU, Volume I – the EU Perspective, Portius - study commissioned by the European 
Commission, Brussels, Final Report, 8 January 2013, 263-264. 
2 T. NOTTEBOOM, Dock labour and port-related employment in the European seaport system, Report 
prepared for European Sea Ports Organisation (ESPO), Antwerpen, ITMMA, 2010, p. 53, 
http://www.espo.be/media/espopublications/ITTMAReportonDockLabourand2010.pdf.  
3 I. KATSAROVA, “Liberalisation of EU port services: issues and consequences for dock workers” in 
Library Briefing, Library of the European Parliament, 20/03/2013, p. 3, http://www.library.ep.ec.  
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countries dock workers were regarded as a specific category of workers. They were 
subject to separate health and safety regulations and excluded from ordinary labour 
law4.  
2. ILO Convention n° 137 
Although the ILO conventions generally apply to dockworkers, the ILO already in 
1929 dedicated a specific convention to the health and safety of dockworkers. 
Convention n° 28 on the protection against accidents of dock workers was revisited in 
1932 by convention n°32 and in 1979 replaced by convention n° 152 on health and 
safety and recommendation n° 160, which supplements it. In 1973 another specific 
convention was adopted. Convention n° 137 concerning the social repercussions of new 
cargo-handling methods in docks, consolidated the pool system, as article 3 required 
the establishment and maintenance of registers for dock work and imposed the 
priority of engagement for registered dockworkers.  
The convention was elaborated in a particular context: the introduction of cranes and 
containers reduced the number of dockworker required to handle cargo, which 
resulted in most European ports in large-scale redundancies of port labour and a steep 
decline in the amount of dockworkers between the 1950s and the late 1970s5. In view 
of the casual nature of the work, the ILO felt the necessity to try to provide 
dockworkers with regular work, or at least to establish a system of allocating work 
that could give them sufficient guarantees of employment and income. For that 
purpose, the ILO considered it necessary to create a system for the registration of 
dockworkers and to control the flow of new entrants to the trade6.  
Although the convention and recommendation were adopted by a very large majority7, 
the convention was only ratified by 25 ILO member states8. Yet, among those 25 states 
there were ten European states9. Nowadays, the ILO considers the convention and 
recommendation as instruments with interim status which means that they are no 
longer fully up to date, but remain relevant in certain respects10. Attempts to revise 
the convention failed because of widely divergent opinions between the workers’ and 
                                                             
4 E. VAN HOOYDONCK, Port Labour in the EU, Volume I – the EU Perspective, Portius - study 
commissioned by the European Commission, Brussels, Final Report, 8 January 2013, p. 55. 
5 T. NOTTEBOOM, Dock labour and port-related employment in the European seaport system, Report 
prepared for European Sea Ports Organisation (ESPO), Antwerpen, ITMMA, 2010, p. 33.  
6 Report of the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations, Report 
III (Part 1B), General Survey of the reports concerning the Dock Work Convention (No. 137) and 
Recommendation (No. 145), 1973, International Labour Conference 90th Session 2002, p. 2. 
7 ILC, 58th Session, 1973, Record of Proceedings, p. 683 and 687-690. 
8 http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:11300:0::NO:11300:P11300_INSTRUMENT_ID:312282.  
9 The ten states are Finland, France, Italy, the Netherlands (which denounced the convention in 2006), 
Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain and Sweden. 
10 Resolutions adopted by the International Labour Conference at its 97th Session, Geneva, June 2008, 
p. 22, footnote 1. 
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employers’ representatives on the relevance of the convention. At the 1996 tripartite 
meeting the workers’ representatives insisted on the need to promote the ratification 
of the Convention, while the employers’ representatives expressed the view that the 
convention ‘was obsolete as it did not respond to the modern needs of the port 
industry’11. 
3. Pool system under pressure 
Since the 1970s the technological innovation in cargo-handling intensified. 
Containerisation and an enhanced accuracy in ship sailing schedules reduced the use 
of casual work, while it urged the sector to become highly capital-intensive12. The 
explosive growth in containerised trade increased the demand for skilled 
dockworkers13 and triggered a trend toward more permanent employment at 
container terminals14. From the 1980’s on, the tradition system of dock work was 
challenged, as port services were liberalised to increase the efficiency and 
competiveness of the ports, the result being that sector-specific rules and regulations 
on recruitment, training and health and safety of port workers were reduced or 
abolished15.  
Economic and efficiency arguments justified the decline in social protection. Pools 
were denounced because of their high direct costs and the rigidity of the supply caused 
by strict job demarcation, low labour mobility and large overmanned gang sizes. They 
would restrict the freedom enjoyed by both employers and employees, by introducing 
a bureaucracy and by limiting competition, and would lead to excessive wages. 
Finally, when dock workers are registered centrally and switch from one employer to 
another they may not develop loyalty towards one or more employers, which might 
form a breeding ground for social conflicts between unions and employers’ 
organizations16.  
The reforms were seldom the result of collective bargaining between management and 
labour. Predominantly, liberalisation was enforced by external interventions of the 
Court of Justice and the European Commission, or an ‘exceptional vigorous national 
                                                             
11 Tripartite Meeting on the Social and Labour Problems caused by Structural Adjustments in the Port 
Industry, Geneva, 20-24 May 1996, Note on the Proceedings, TMPI/1996/10, paras. 31-32. 
12 H.E. HARALAMBIDES, “Port Structural Adjustment and Labour Reform”, p. 5-6,  
www.academia.edu/2037483.  
13 Report of the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations, Report 
III (Part 1B), General Survey of the reports concerning the Dock Work Convention (No. 137) and 
Recommendation (No. 145), 1973, International Labour Conference 90th Session 2002, p. 31. 
14 T. NOTTEBOOM, Dock labour and port-related employment in the European seaport system, Report 
prepared for European Sea Ports Organisation (ESPO), Antwerpen, ITMMA, 2010, p. 38.  
15 E. VAN HOOYDONCK, Port Labour in the EU, Volume I – the EU Perspective, Portius - study 
commissioned by the European Commission, Brussels, Final Report, 8 January 2013, p. 35-43. 
16 T. NOTTEBOOM, Dock labour and port-related employment in the European seaport system, Report 
prepared for European Sea Ports Organisation (ESPO), Antwerpen, ITMMA, 2010, p. 55. 
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government policy’17. Moreover, most port reform and port labour reform took place 
in periods where there was a strong economic downturn and or there were serious 
problems with the competitiveness of individual ports or the (national) port system, 
because in periods of recession trade unions are weaker and employers less likely to 
avoid disputes which could temporarily immobilize their resources18.  
4. Legal challenges: Council of Europe 
At the level of the Council of Europe the pool system has been tackled two times in 
the context of the negative freedom of association as the European Committee on 
Social Rights suspected the existence of closed shop practices. In the 1990s the 
European Committee on Social Rights objected to the former pool system in France. 
Before 1992, in order to be employed, dockworkers had to hold a licence, issued on the 
recommendation of a committee made up of an equal number of employers’ and 
employees’ representatives, which were all members of the CGT. Objections were 
made against the fact that only dockworkers belonging to the CGT were recruited19. 
In 1992 the licence requirement was abolished for the great majority of dockworkers, 
but the Committee still worried about the implementation20.  
The Committee also made observations on the Belgian system. It noted that in certain 
economic sectors recruitment quotas provided that workers be chosen from among the 
quotas allocated to various trade unions. The Committee raised questions concerning 
those closed shop practices and the protection afforded to non-unionised workers and 
sought clarification21. The next report gave the example of the Port of Antwerp, where 
this system of recruitment should have operated jointly between trade unions and 
employers. Again the Committee asked for clarification of the legal protection of non-
unionised workers22. The subsequent report did not contain the information 
requested23, but in the following report the Belgian state was happy to announce that 
the system of recruitment of dockworkers at Antwerp was fundamentally changed. 
This change enabled the Committee to consider the situation to be in conformity with 
the Charter in this respect24.  
                                                             
17 Italy and Spain were condemned by the Court of Justice, while Greece, Ireland, Malta and Portugal 
had to adapt their legislation by order of the European Commission. In the UK and France the 
abolishment of the pool system was the outcome of a government policy by Margaret Thatcher and 
Nicolas Sarkozy, see E. VAN HOOYDONCK, “Het Spaanse Havenarbeidersarrest (C-576/13): 
doodsteek voor de klassieke havenpools”, Tijdschrift Vervoer & Recht 2015, n° 2, p. 37. 
18 T. NOTTEBOOM, Dock labour and port-related employment in the European seaport system, Report 
prepared for European Sea Ports Organisation (ESPO), Antwerpen, ITMMA, 2010, p. 61. 
19 L. HISLAIRE, Dockers, corporatisme et changement, Transports Actualités, Parijs, Group Usine 
Nouvelle, 1993, 25. 
20 ECSR, Conclusions XIII-1, XIII-3, XIV-1 and XV-1. 
21 ECSR, Conclusions XIII-2 and XIII-4. 
22 ECSR, Conclusions XIV-1.  
23 ECSR, Conclusions XV-1. 
24 ECSR, Conclusions XVI-1. 
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At present a collective complaint against the Norway is pending before the European 
Committee on Social Rights, in which Bedriftsforbundet, an employers’ organisation 
for SMEs, alleged that there is a consistent and long term practice at Norwegian ports 
requiring that employees have membership of the dockworkers union25. 
5. Legal challenges: EU 
In its 1997 Green Paper26 the European Commission announced its willingness to 
liberalise port services. A first draft directive, known as the first port services 
package, was proposed in 200127. The draft directive which included the principle of 
self-handling was opposed by the dockworkers’ unions and consequently rejected by 
the European Parliament in 2003. A second draft directive, known as the second port 
services package, was introduced in 200428. As it was only slightly adapted, it did 
meet with the same fate in 200629. In 2011 the Commission adopted a White Paper30 
in which it indicated that market access to ports needed to be further improved. 
However, a new strategy was developed. While the Commission formulated a new 
proposal for a regulation31, it also did proceed to launch infringement procedures or 
impose reform in the context of other EU policies32.  
In the 1990s employers’ recourses to the Court of Justice have been successful in 
reshaping the Italian legislation on dock work. In Merci33 the Italian legislation which 
reserved the performance of dock work in the port of Genova to dock-work companies 
whose workers, who are also members of these companies, had to be of Italian 
                                                             
25 Collective complaint no.  103/2013, Bedriftsforbundet v Norway. 
26 Green Paper on sea ports and maritime infrastructure, Brussels, 10 December 1997, COM(97) 678 
def. 
27 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Market Access to Port 
Services, COM(2001) 35 final, http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2001:154E:0290:0296:EN:PDF.  
28 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on market access to port 
services, COM(2004) 654 final, http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2004:0654:FIN:EN:PDF.  
29 I. KATSAROVA, “Liberalisation of EU port services: issues and consequences for dock workers” in 
Library Briefing, Library of the European Parliament, 20/03/2013, p. 5.  
30 Roadmap to a Single European Transport  Area – Towards a competitive and resource efficient 
transport system, COM(2011) 144 final, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52011DC0144&from=EN.  
31 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a framework 
on market access to port services and financial transparency of ports, Brussels, 23 May 2013, 
COM/2013/296 def, 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/com/com_com%282013%290296_/com
_com%282013%290296_en.pdf.  
32 This option was favoured as ‘it would be more targeted and efficient than a legislative proposal which 
may again stir up controversy and social unrest.’, see E. VAN HOOYDONCK, Port Labour in the EU, 
Volume I – the EU Perspective, Portius - study commissioned by the European Commission, Brussels, 
Final Report, 8 January 2013, p. 314 and 328. 
33 CoJEU 10 December 1991, C-179/90, ECLI:EU:C:1991:464, Jur. 1991, p. I-5889.  
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nationality, was disapproved of. Article 90(1) of the EEC Treaty, in conjunction with 
articles 30, 48 and 86 of the Treaty, precluded national rules which confer on a local 
undertaking the exclusive right to organize dock work and require it for that purpose 
to have recourse to a dock-work company formed exclusively of national workers. The 
Court also disaffirmed that a dock-work undertaking could be regarded as being 
entrusted with the operation of services of general economic interest within the 
meaning of article 90(2) of the Treaty.  
In response to the judgement the Italian legislation was modified, and henceforth, 
restricted the monopoly of the former dock-work companies to the supply of temporary 
labour. Yet, another case was brought before the Court. In Raso34 about the port of La 
Spezia, the exclusive right to supply temporary labour granted to the former dock-
work companies was contested as the companies were also authorised to carry out 
dock work. The Court considered this to be contrary to articles 86 and 90 of the Treaty, 
although the national court did not identify any particular case of abuse.  
However, in 1999 in Becu35 the application of the competition law reached his limits. 
Since the Belgian legislation merely recognises the occupation of dockworkers without 
conferring a monopoly on undertakings or on trade associations, the Belgian pool 
system could not be dealt with on the basis of article 90(1) of the EC Treaty, read in 
conjunction with the articles 85 and 86 of the EC Treaty. The articles are only 
applicable on ‘undertakings’, but recognised dockworkers in a port area did not in 
themselves constitute undertakings within the meaning of Community competition 
law, nor could they, even taken collectively, be regarded as constituting an 
undertaking. In the same year three judgements of the Court conferred immunity 
from competition law to collective agreements36.  
These evolutions might have persuaded the Commission to approach the Spanish pool 
system in a different way. In Commission v Spain37 the Spanish law which obliged 
terminal operators to participate in a dock-work company and prevent them from 
hiring their own staff, was alleged to be an infringement on freedom of establishment 
of article 49 of the TFEU. The case basically concerned port services, but was 
presented under the pretext of the freedom of establishment since the freedom of 
services might not apply on ports38. The Court found the restrictions not to be justified 
by imperative reasons of general interest as there exist less restrictive measures to 
guarantee the same outcome with regard to the continuity, regularity and quality of 
                                                             
34 CoJEU 12 February 1998, C-163/96, ECLI:EU:C:1998:54, Jur. 1998, p. I-533. 
35 CoJEU 16 September 1999, C-22/98, ECLI:EU:C:1999:419, Jur. 1999, p. I-5665. 
36 CoJEU 21 September 1999, C-67/96, Jur. 1999, p. I-5751 (Albany); CoJEU 21 September 1999, C-
115/97, C-116/97 and C-117/97, Jur. 1999, p. I-6025 (Brentjens); CoJEU 21 September 1999, C-219/97, 
Jur. 1999, p. I-6121 (Drijvende bokken).  
37 CoJEU 11 December 2014, C-576/13, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2430, http://curia.europa.eu.  
38 See article 58.1 read in conjunction with 100.0 TFEU. 
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the service as well as the protection of the workers. The ILO convention n° 137 
invoked by the Spanish government, was not taken into consideration by the Court. 
As the Commission in 2004 called on the member states to ratify the convention39, it 
probably did not see an inconsistency between its interpretation of the freedom of 
establishment and the ILO convention, being designed as a flexible instrument to 
establish minimum standards40. Accordingly, the Court stated that it would be 
possible to leave it up to the terminal operators to hire permanent or temporary 
workers as well as to administer or make use of the services of temporary work 
agencies.  
Meanwhile the Court of Justice acknowledged that the principle of freedom of 
establishment did apply on collective agreements41, which permitted the Commission 
to tackle national systems that could not be contested earlier42. In 2014 Belgium 
received its first notice43. At present the Belgian government is negotiating with the 
Commission and the social partners. An agreement between government and social 
partners is reached in April 2016. However, no details have been made public as the 
agreement has to be approved by the rank and file of the dockworkers’ unions. Yet, 
already leaked out that employers would be allowed progressively to hire their own 
workers and organise their proper training. 
6. Legal challenges: EFTA 
On April 19, 201644 the EFTA Court had the opportunity to determine its position on 
the Norwegian pool system. Different from previous cases before the Court of Justice, 
in Norway the priority of engagement for registered dockworkers is based on collective 
agreements. In het port of Drammen these dockworkers are permanently employed 
by the Administrative Office for Dock Work. As a Danish company, Holship refused 
to respect the agreement, the Norwegian transport union NTF notified a boycott to 
compel it to do so. In view of the case law of the Court of Justice on Viking and Laval 
it also asked the national courts whether such action was lawful. Before the Supreme 
Court referred the case to the EFTA Court, two national courts had declared the 
                                                             
39 COM/2004/0654, par. 2.3. 
40 Report of the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations, Report 
III (Part 1B), General Survey of the reports concerning the Dock Work Convention (No. 137) and 
Recommendation (No. 145), 1973, International Labour Conference 90th Session 2002, p. 7. 
41 CoJEU 11 December 2007, C-438/05, Jur. 2007, p. I-10779 (Viking); CoJEU 15 July 2010, C-271/08, 
Jur. 2010, p. I-7091 (Commission v Germany). 
42 Like pool systems solely based on collective agreements, see with regard to the Netherlands: Rb. 
Rotterdam 28 januari 1999, 112155/KG ZA 99-119 (Matrans Marine Services B.V. en Transcore 
Rotterdam B.V./FNV Bondgenoten); Rb. Utrecht 24 juli 2009, ECLI:NL:RBUTR:2009:BJ3474, 
www.rechtspraak.nl. 
43 Brief van de Europese Commissie aan België van 28 maart 2014, ref. 20104/2088, C/2014/1874 def. 
44 EFTA Ct, E-14/15, Holship Norge AS v Norsk Transportarbeiderforbund, 
http://www.eftacourt.int/cases/.  
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boycott lawful. Like the Court of Justice in Albany the EFTA Court in LO45 exempted 
collective agreements from the scope of the EEA competition rules. However, the 
EFTA Court applies the recent case law of the Court of Justice which increasingly 
confines the exemption46. Consequently, the EFTA Court ruled that the exemption 
does not cover the assessment of a priority of engagement rule, or a boycott against a 
port user in order to procure acceptance of a collective agreement which entails such 
a priority of engagement rule. Only a very small margin of interpretation is left to the 
national courts as to the assessment of the AO system under article 53 and 54 EEA, 
since the Court observed that it appears difficult to demonstrate the necessity and no 
services of general economic interest are concerned.  
Moreover, the Court states that a boycott to procure acceptance of a collective 
agreement providing for a system which includes a priority clause, is likely to 
discourage or even prevent the establishment of companies from other EEA states 
and thereby constitutes a restriction on the freedom of establishment. No credit was 
given to the ILO convention n° 137 as protocol 35 to the EEA Agreement stipulates 
that in case of a conflict between national law implementing EEA law and other 
national provisions not implementing EEA law, the EFTA states has to introduce a 
statutory provision to the effect that national law implementing EEA shall prevail.  
However, the decisions of the EFTA Court do not have the same binding nature as 
the rulings of the Court of Justice47. Particularly in Norway, the Supreme Court held 
that the opinions of the EFTA Court are of an advisory character only and that it is 
for the Supreme Court to decide for itself whether and to what extent they were to be 
applied48. Cases in which the Norwegian Supreme Court did depart from the 
judgement of the EFTA Court are rare49. However, in STX50, a case similar to Laval, 
it refused to follow the EFTA Court’s decision and decided that expenses for travel, 
board and lodging were covered by the term ‘pay’51. As the decision of the Norwegian 
                                                             
45 EFTA Ct., E-8/00, Landsorganisasjonen i Norge, 2002, Ct. Rep. 114. 
46  
47 N. FENGER, M. SÁNCHEZ RYDELSKI, T. VAN STIPHOUT, European Free Trade Association 
(EFTA) and the European Economic Area (EEA), Alphen aan den Rijn, Kluwer Law International, 
2012, p. 157. 
48 Norwegian Supreme Court, Finanger, Rt-2000, 1811; C. BARNARD, ‘Reciprocity, Homogeneity and 
Loyal Cooperation: Dealing with Recalcitrant National Courts?’ in EFTA Court (ed.), The EEA and the 
EFTA Court, Oxford and Portland, Oregon, Hart Publishing, 2014, p. 159. 
49 T.C. POULSEN, ‘Norwegian Courts’ in C. BAUDENBACHER (ed.), The Handbook of EEA Law, 
Cham – Heidelberg – New York – Dordrecht – London, Springer, 2016, p. 267. 
50 EFTA Ct, E-2/11, STX v Norway Offshore AS, http://www.eftacourt.int/cases/.  
51 Norwegian Supreme Court, judgement of 5 March 2013 in Case HR-2013-0496-A (case no. 
2012/1447); C. BARNARD, ‘Social Policy Law’ in C. BAUDENBACHER (ed.), The Handbook of EEA 
Law, Cham – Heidelberg – New York – Dordrecht – London, Springer, 2016, p. 815; C. BARNARD, 
‘Reciprocity, Homogeneity and Loyal Cooperation: Dealing with Recalcitrant National Courts?’ in 
EFTA Court (ed.), The EEA and the EFTA Court, Oxford and Portland, Oregon, Hart Publishing, 2014, 
p. 160. 
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Supreme Court was highly debated, it is doubtful whether it will be repeated. Besides, 
if an EFTA Court’s decision is not implemented, the EFTA Surveillance Authority 
may initiate an infringement procedure52. The Court of Justice is not bound by the 
case law of the EFTA Court, but in practice frequently refers to its judgements53. 
7. A happy ending … 
Although favoured by an ILO convention, pool systems which provides for the priority 
of engagement for registered dockworkers are already for decades subjected to 
pressure. They have been tackled by national governments as well as at the level of 
the Council of Europe, the EU and the EEA. Since the beginning of the financial crisis, 
however, the attacks appear to intensify. The European Commission in particular 
wants to liberalise port services. On several occasions the commission clarified that 
its aim is the replacement of the pool systems by permanent or temporary staff hired 
by the terminal operators or put at their disposal by private recruitment agencies. 
Unlike the EFTA Court (which simply denied the ILO convention n° 137), the 
Commission and the Court of Justice seem to see no discrepancy between the 
liberalising of ports and the ILO convention n° 137. Although the convention is 
presupposed to be a flexible instrument which only entails minimum standards, it is 
unlikely that a full-scale liberalisation of port services corresponds to the convention. 
The registration of dockworkers not merely a formality, but a mean to allocate the 
available dock work. The long-term objective of the convention was to either 
guarantee dockworkers permanent employment, or failing that, at least regularity of 
employment or stabilization of their earnings, and registration has been the primary 
means of identifying workers for that purpose54.  
Moreover, another reason for registration was to ensure that adequate training in 
cargo-handling is available to the workforce as the use of modern equipment requires 
the employment of a skilled, trained and responsible workforce. The Committee of 
Experts stresses that systematic use of casual labour cannot offer the same 
guarantees55. However, although many employers pursue the reversal of 
decasualization schemes, they still wish their casual dock workers to enjoy 
appropriate training. But, contrary to the current situation, the training should be 
                                                             
52 C. BAUDENBACHER, ‘The EFTA Court: Structure and Tasks’ in C. BAUDENBACHER (ed.), The 
Handbook of EEA Law, Cham – Heidelberg – New York – Dordrecht – London, Springer, 2016, 161. 
53 N. FENGER, M. SÁNCHEZ RYDELSKI, T. VAN STIPHOUT, European Free Trade Association 
(EFTA) and the European Economic Area (EEA), Alphen aan den Rijn, Kluwer Law International, 
2012, p. 75. 
54 Report of the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations, Report 
III (Part 1B), General Survey of the reports concerning the Dock Work Convention (No. 137) and 
Recommendation (No. 145), 1973, International Labour Conference 90th Session 2002, p. 50. 
55 Report of the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations, Report 
III (Part 1B), General Survey of the reports concerning the Dock Work Convention (No. 137) and 
Recommendation (No. 145), 1973, International Labour Conference 90th Session 2002, p. 59. 
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developed in-house or outsourced to professional training agencies56. If continued, the 
outcome of the case law of the Court of Justice and the EFTA Court will be a 
privatisation of dock work and training, which occurs by bypassing the trade unions 
and the European Parliament which opposed similar legislative initiates. 
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56 T. NOTTEBOOM, Dock labour and port-related employment in the European seaport system, Report 
prepared for European Sea Ports Organisation (ESPO), Antwerpen, ITMMA, 2010, p. 56; E. VAN 
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